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Kenneth Mould* 
1 Introduction 
 
During the 1990s, rugby union formation in the Republic of South Africa developed 
rapidly from a system of strict amateurism to one of professionalism.1 Professional 
participants in the sport received salaries for participation, and rugby became a 
business like any other. As in all forms of business, rugby had to be regulated more 
efficiently than had previously been the case. Tighter regulations were instituted by 
governing bodies, and ultimately labour legislation became applicable to professional 
rugby.2 
 
The primary tool for regulating business in general is the contract. In fact, Whitehill 
goes so far as to state that "the professional sports industry is founded upon the 
basic contract".3 Rugby, which effectively commenced functioning as a "business" in 
South Africa after the 1995 Rugby World Cup, is no exception. However, the exact 
nature of the contract regulating the relationship between a professional rugby player 
and his employer in South Africa, but also internationally, deserves closer attention. 
Naudè4 has indicated how the contract between a professional football club and its 
head coach, whilst in essence a contract of employment, possesses certain sui 
generis characteristics. These characteristics have recently had a significant 
influence on the way in which South African courts perceive the contract regulating 
the relationship between a professional rugby player and his employer.5 This article 
attempts to analyse the nature and functioning of the contract mentioned, while 
indicating how the sui generis characteristics applied to such contracts in the case of 
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1
 Cloete Introduction to Sports Law 3. 
2
 Cloete Introduction to Sports Law 4. 
3
 Whitehill 1981-1982 Sw L J 803. 
4
 Naudé 2003 TSAR 269. 
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Santos Professional Football Club (Pty) Ltd v Igesund6 and discussed by Naudé 
have had a significant effect on the High Court decision in Vrystaat Cheetahs (Edms) 
Beperk v Mapoe.7 Suggestions are made, based on the most recent authority, on 
how similar cases will be dealt with by the courts in future. In order to make these 
suggestions, the suitability of the contractual remedy of specific performance to 
breach of a player's contract in South African law must be investigated. 
 
To indicate how the contract of employment that governs the relationship between 
the professional rugby player and his employer in South African law differs from the 
prima facie contract of employment, it is necessary to investigate the nature and 
development of the latter in South Africa and abroad. Only by determining what a 
contract of employment in the general sense of the term entails will one be able to 
prove that the contract between the professional rugby player and his employer in 
fact differs from the former, as it possesses sui generis characteristics. It can 
therefore be described as a sui generis contract of employment which demands a sui 
generis approach to determining the most suitable remedy in case of breach thereof. 
 
2 The employment relationship in South Africa 
 
In order to indicate how the fact that a player's contract possesses sui generis 
characteristics had an influence on the determining of an appropriate remedy for 
breach of contract in the case of Santos Professional Football Club (Pty) Ltd v 
Igesund8 as well as the Mapoe decision mentioned above, the nature of the 
employment relationship and employment contract in South African law must be 
investigated. 
 
                                                                                                                                       
5
 The contract of employment between a professional rugby player and his employer will be 
referred to in this article as a "player's contract", for clarity's sake. 
6
 Santos Professional Football Club (Pty) Ltd v Igesund 2003 5 SA 73 (C). 
7
 Vrystaat Cheetahs (Edms) Beperk v Mapoe Case Number 4587/2010 decided on 29 September 
2010 in the Free State Provincial Division of the High Court. Hereinafter referred to in the text as 
the Mapoe-case. 
8
 Santos Professional Football Club (Pty) Ltd v Igesund 2003 5 SA 73 (C). Hereinafter referred to 
in the text as the Santos-case. 
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According to section 213 of the Labour Relations Act,9 an "employee" is defined as 
the following: 
 
(a) any person, excluding an independent contractor, who works for another 
person or for the State and who receives, or is entitled to receive, any 
remuneration; and 
(b) any other person who in any other manner assists in carrying on or 
conducting the business of an employer; and "employed" and "employment" 
have meanings corresponding with that of "employee". 
 
According to Van Jaarsveld and Van Eck, a contract of employment can be defined 
as "a mutual agreement in terms of which an employee makes available his services 
for a determined period and remuneration under authority of the employer".10 The 
Code of Good Practice11 states that a person will be considered an employee if, 
firstly, the person "works or renders services to the person or entity cited in the 
proceedings as his or her employer"12 and secondly if one of seven factors is present 
in the relationship with one person or entity. These factors determine that a person 
would be considered an employee if one or more of the following is present:13 
 
(a) the manner in which the person works is subject to the control or direction of 
another person; 
(b) the person's hours of work are subject to the control or direction of another 
person; 
(c) in the case of a person who works for an organisation, the person forms part of 
that organisation; 
(d) the person has worked for that one person for an average of at least 40 hours per 
month over the last three months; 
(e) the person is economically dependent on the other person for whom he or she 
works or renders services; 
                                            
9
 Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. See also s 1 of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 
1997; s 1 of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 and Van Jaarsveld and Van Eck Principles of 
Labour Law 50. 
10
 Van Jaarsveld and Van Eck Principles of Labour Law 49; Jordaan "Sport and Employment" 1. 
11
 GN 1774 in GG 29445 of 1 December 2006 (hereinafter referred to as the Code of Good 
Practice). 
12
 Code of Good Practice s 15. 
13
 Code of Good Practice s 18. See in this regard also Snyman and Deacon 2009 PELJ 147. 
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(f) the person is provided with the tools of trade or work equipment by the other 
person; or 
(g) the person works for or renders services to only one person. 
 
When considering these factors, it is clear that professional sportsmen and 
sportswomen can be classified as "employees" governed by "contracts of 
employment".14 It should be noted, however, that this fact applies only to 
professional participants in team sports, such as rugby and soccer. Self-employed 
professional sportsmen and sportswomen, such as tennis players, boxers and 
golfers, fall instead into the category of "entrepreneurs" or independent contractors, 
whose professional contracts are based on the Roman law locatio conductio operis, 
or contract of work.15 In the case of Walker v Crystal Palace Football Club,16 Cozens-
Hardy MR confirmed the fact that the professional sportsman, in this case a football 
player, is considered an employee of the club that employs him, despite the sui 
generis nature of his services. This is evident from the following statement of the 
court in this case: 
 
It has been argued before us very forcibly by Mr Russell that there is a certain 
difference between an ordinary workman and a man who contracts to exhibit 
and employ his skill where the employer would have no right to dictate to him 
in the exercise of that skill; e.g., the club in this case would have no right to 
dictate to him how he should play football. I am unable to follow that. He is 
bound according to the express terms of his contract to obey all general 
directions of the club, and I think in any particular game in which he was 
engaged he would also be bound to obey the particular instructions of the 
captain or whoever it might be who was the delegate of the club for the 
purpose of giving those instructions. In my judgment it cannot be that a man 
is taken out of the operation of the Act simply because in doing a particular 
kind of work which he is employed to do and in doing which he obeys general 
instructions, he also exercises his own judgment uncontrolled by anybody.17 
 
One must consequently first accept the fact that although the nature of the services 
provided by a professional rugby player differs from the services provided by an 
                                            
14
 The "contract of employment" mentioned here is based on the Roman law locatio conductio 
operarum, or contract of service. In this regard see also Prinsloo 2000 TSAR 229; Jordaan "Sport 
and Employment" 1. 
15
 Gardiner et al Sports Law 477; Jordaan "Sport and Employment" 1. 
16
 Walker v Crystal Palace Football Club Ltd 1910 1 KB 87 (CA). Hereinafter referred to in the text 
as the Walker-case. 
17
 Walker v Crystal Palace Football Club Ltd 1910 1 KB 87 (CA) 92. 
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employee in the general sense of the word, the relationship that exists between the 
player and his employer is in essence one of "employment" as defined above. 
 
According to Le Roux, the South African concept of the contract of employment, 
whilst a new one, is currently in a state of relative unity.18 Because there are 
undeniable similarities between the development of the contract of employment in 
South Africa and Britain, Le Roux correctly depends on the development of this type 
of contract in English law.19 In Britain, the existence of a "master and servant" 
relationship was established, up until the 1970s, by applying the "control test".20 This 
test basically proclaimed that a person would be considered an employee if such a 
person were to be "told what to do and how to do it by someone else, with little or 
[no] choice in the matter".21 In South Africa, the "master and servant" laws were 
repealed in 1974.22 However, the current South African definition of a contract of 
employment still possesses an element of authority of the employer over the 
employee. In the court's decision in the Walker-case, Cozens-Hardy made mention 
of the argument that "there is a certain difference between an ordinary workman and 
a man who contracts to exhibit and employ his skill where the employer would have 
no right to dictate to him in the exercise of that skill; e.g. the club in this case would 
have no right to dictate to him how he should play football".23 Although the court did 
not agree with this argument (which was presented on behalf of Walker), it is a valid 
argument nonetheless, especially in the context of professional rugby union today. 
Van Jaarsveld and Van Eck claim that there is much difference of opinion as far as 
the nature and description of the feature of "authority" in the contract of employment 
is concerned. These authors believe that the relationship of authority between the 
employer and employee in South African law encompasses three components.24 
These components are: the services are rendered in respect of a subordinate 
                                            
18
 Le Roux 2010 ILJ 139-165. 
19
 Le Roux notes that she relied on the views of Deakin on the evolution of the contract of 
employment in Britain. See Le Roux 2010 ILJ 140. 
20
 Le Roux 2010 ILJ 148; Blackshaw "Professional Athlete" 1; Gardiner et al Sports Law 477. 
21
 Le Roux 2010 ILJ 148; Blackshaw "Professional Athlete" 1; Gardiner et al Sports Law 477. 
22
 Le Roux 2010 ILJ 142. 
23
 Walker v Crystal Palace Football Club Ltd 1910 1 KB 87 (CA) 92. 
24
 Van Jaarsveld and Van Eck Principles of Labour Law 54. 
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relationship; the services are rendered under control and supervision; and the 
employer gives guidance to the employee during the rendering of the services.25 
 
When these components are considered, it is clear that Cozens-Hardy's decision in 
the Walker-case was based on the fact that he considered a professional sportsman 
to be an employee in every sense of the word. What these components entail is that 
the employee has a duty to behave in a subordinate manner towards his employer 
under supervision of the latter, and accept the guidance of the employer in services 
he or she renders.26 This argument was confirmed in the case of Colonial Mutual Life 
Assurance Society v Macdonald.27 In casu, the court stated the following: 
 
In the former case (locatio conductio operarum) the relation between the two 
contracting parties is much more intimate than in the latter (locatio conductio 
operis), the servant becoming subordinate to the master, whereas in the latter 
case the contractor remains on a footing of equality with the employer. Where 
a master engages a servant to work for him the master is entitled under the 
contract to supervise and control the work of the servant. He is entitled at any 
time to order the servant to desist, and if the matter is sufficiently serious may 
even dismiss him for disobedience. Although the opportunity of supervising 
and controlling which a master is able to exercise over a servant may vary 
greatly with circumstances, it cannot be said to be altogether unreasonable to 
hold him liable for the torts of his servant. But because even in the case of a 
master and servant effective supervision and control is in some case difficult if 
not entirely absent that is no reason for extending the liability of the principal 
to include the torts of a man over whose actions he has no say whatever.28 
 
Le Roux notes that this decision is sometimes erroneously understood as authority 
for the proposition that the employer must have actual control over the employee's 
work.29 In fact, the court never required more than a mere right to control, and 
conceded that actual control could even be absent.30 This is, however, not to say 
that control should not play any role when a decision must be made as to whether or 
not an employment relationship exists, as insinuated in the Walker-case.31 
 
                                            
25
 Van Jaarsveld and Van Eck Principles of Labour Law 54. 
26
 Van Jaarsveld and Van Eck Principles of Labour Law 54-55. 
27
 Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society v Macdonald 1931 AD 412. 
28
 Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society v Macdonald 1931 AD 412 433. 
29
 Le Roux 2010 ILJ 150. 
30
 Le Roux 2010 ILJ 150. 
31
 Le Roux 2010 ILJ 150; Walker v Crystal Palace Football Club Ltd 1910 1 KB 87 (CA) 92. 
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While it should be remembered that this decision was made during a period in which 
the "master and servant" approach was still strictly adhered to in South African law, 
the sentiment was confirmed in the case of Smit v Workmen's Compensation 
Commissioner,32 in which the Appellate Division had to decide whether the appellant 
was in fact an employee or "workman" as contemplated by section 3(1) of the 
Workmen's Compensation Act.33 The Court in the person of Joubert JA, while finally 
substituting the "control test" of English law with the so-called "dominant impression"-
test,34 came to the same conclusion as in the Colonial Mutual Life Assurance-case 
referred to above as to the fact that an employee effectively operated under the 
authority of the employer.35 
 
Having established what the employment relationship in South Africa currently 
entails, it is essential to establish how the contract between a professional 
sportsman or sportswoman as an employee and his or her employer in South African 
law relates to this relationship, and more importantly, how the latter relationship 
differs from the former. 
 
 
3 The position before professionalism in rugby union: Troskie v Van der 
Walt 
 
Although the decision in the case of Troskie v Van der Walt,36 which dates back to 
the amateur era of rugby, strictly speaking falls outside of the scope of this article, 
mainly because in the case of Troskie no relationship of employment existed 
between the contracting parties, various relevant legal points were dealt with by the 
                                            
32
 Smit v Workmen's Compensation Commissioner 1979 1 SA 51 (A). 
33
 Workmen's Compensation Act 30 of 1941. 
34
 In the case of Ongevallekommissaris v Onderlinge Versekeringsgenootskap Avbob 1976 4 SA 
446 (A), in conceding that control by an employer over an employee is no longer decisive in 
determining the presence of a relationship of employment, the court decided that when a certain 
relationship exhibits characteristics of employment as well as of another type of relationship, the 
court must ask itself what dominant impression is created by the contract. See also Le Roux 
2010 ILJ 155; Joubert General Principles 1. 
35
 It must be kept in mind, though, that in the Colonial Mutual Life Assurance-case, the respondent 
was eventually classified as an independent contractor under the locatio conductio operis, while 
in the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner-case, the appellant was eventually classified as 
an employee or "servant" under the locatio conductio operarum. 
36
  Troskie v Van der Walt 1994 3 SA 545 (O). 
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court a quo as well as the full bench of the High Court. In casu, Van der Walt, who 
played for the Free State rugby team in the early nineties, had entered into a 
contract with the appellant in the abovementioned application on the 24th of January 
1991.37 The entire contract read as follows: 
 
Nico het R1 500 gekry van 1991 in 1990. 
Vandag 24-1-91 van R4 000 is R3 000 vir Nico se rugby by O/G38 R1 000 sal 
ons besluit of dit 'n deel van 1992 is of 'n lening. 
(Get) 
N van der Walt (1991-seisoen) 
(Get) 
WP Troskie39 
 
The first appellant and the respondent had thus entered into a contract which 
basically obliged the respondent to play rugby for the second appellant (Old Greys 
Rugby Football Club) for the entire 1991 season. In return, the respondent was to be 
paid the amount of R4 000.40 As it turned out, the respondent joined the opposing 
Collegians-club on 18 February 1991, with the intention of forthwith playing his club 
rugby for that particular club. The requirements for repudiation as a form of breach of 
contract were at the time of the decision as follows:41 
 
- The debtor (respondent in current case) must have no intention of honouring 
his/her part of the contract. 
- The debtor (respondent in current case) must inform the creditor (first appellant in 
current case) of his/her intention not to honour the contract. 
- The creditor (first appellant in the current case) must accept the debtor's 
repudiation as an act of breach of contract.42 
 
                                            
37
 Troskie v Van der Walt 1994 3 SA 545 (O) 548. 
38
 The "Old Greys" club in Bloemfontein. 
39
 Troskie v Van der Walt 1994 3 SA 545 (O) 548. 
40
 As stated earlier, the contract in question was entered into in an era when all levels of rugby 
union played in South Africa still had to adhere to the amateur code. The contract stated 
expressly that the respondent was to be paid for playing rugby, which made the contract for all 
practical and legal purposes void ab initio. See Troskie v Van der Walt 1994 3 SA 545 (O) 550. 
41
 Van der Merwe et al Contract: General Principles 363-364. 
42
 It has been argued with some merit that this requirement is obsolete, most notably by Hutchison 
Forms of Breach 311. 
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In the case under discussion, the respondent's actions left no doubt as to the fact 
that he did not intend to honour his contract. The creditor (first appellant) was 
informed of this intention. However, the creditor did not accept the debtor's 
repudiation in this matter.43 The creditor (Troskie in his personal capacity and on 
behalf of the Old Greys club) applied for an order compelling the debtor (Van der 
Walt) to play for the Old Greys club for the course of the 1991-season. In essence, 
the appellant sought an order for specific performance of the obligations in question. 
The question which had to be answered was if a court could order specific 
performance of a contractual obligation that would essentially compel a rugby player 
to play for a team for which he was unwilling to play. Wright J, writing on behalf of 
the full bench, held the following:44 
 
Die aard van die dienste wat in die onderhawige saak gelewer moes word, is 
die speel van rugby vir 'n besondere klub. Die lewering van die betrokke 
diens is nie alleen afhanklik van die persoonlike entoesiasme, bereidwilligheid 
en deursettingsvermoë van die besondere speler nie, maar ook is daar aan 
die betrokke dienste 'n groot mate van kundigheid, bedrewenheid en 
vaardigheid van persoonlike aard verbonde en wat afhanklik sal wees van die 
besondere speler se spesifieke eienskappe en ook sy verhouding met die 
klub vir wie hy rugby speel. Dit is sterk te betwyfel of daar in die besondere 
omstandighede van hierdie saak ooit 'n bevel van spesifieke nakoming gepas 
sou kon wees, heeltemal afgesien van die feit dat die amateurkode van die 
Internasionale Rugbyvoetbalraad ook nog van toepassing is. 
 
In addition, the court a quo in the current case, in the person of Malherbe JP, 
decided the following:45 
 
Na my mening is dit 'n belaglike smeekbede en sal geen redelike Hof so 'n 
bevel tot spesifieke nakoming van Van der Walt se beweerde kontraktuele 
verpligting gelas nie. 
 
What is interesting about Wright J's decision is that he emphasises the fact that in 
the current case an order for specific performance may never be granted, "afgesien 
van die feit dat die amateurkode van die Internasionale Rugbyvoetbalraad ook nog 
van toepassing is".46 By implication, an order for specific performance in similar 
circumstances would not have been granted, even if rugby had already been a 
                                            
43
 Troskie v Van der Walt 1994 3 SA 545 (O) 548. 
44
 Troskie v Van der Walt 1994 3 SA 545 (O) 552. 
45
 Troskie v Van der Walt 1994 3 SA 545 (O) 553. 
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professional sport at the time of the judgment. Le Roux stated in 2003 that the 
perception existed that "courts are reluctant to order specific performance in cases of 
breach of contract where the defaulting party is required to render performance of a 
very personal nature, such as contracts of employment".47 Christie agrees with this 
statement, noting that "an order for the specific performance of a contract of 
employment will, in the exercise of the court's discretion, not normally be granted… 
the reason why the courts have not granted such orders remain as valid as ever, 
provided it is remembered that in every case the court has a discretion".48 Kerr adds 
that "no court, for example, can force a singer to sing or an artist to paint a picture 
because these tasks require the application of highly personal skills".49 
 
The Troskie-decision had a significant influence on some decisions with similar facts 
in the professional era of sport. Consequently, these decisions must be investigated 
before deciding on the appropriateness of the remedy of specific performance in 
case of breach of a player's contract, or any other contract of employment for that 
matter that involves the rendering of "services of a personal nature".  
 
4 The position after rugby union became professional 
 
4.1 Santos Professional Football Club (Pty) Ltd v Igesund50 
 
The main difference between the context in which the Troskie-case was decided and 
that in which the Santos-case was decided was the fact that in the latter, a contract 
of employment existed between the parties. The applicant in the abovementioned 
case, a professional soccer club, and the first respondent, a professional soccer 
coach, had entered into a contract stating that the latter would coach the former's 
professional team for a period of two years from 20 July 2001 to 30 June 2003.51 On 
the 24th of June 2002, the first respondent wrote a letter of termination of his services 
                                                                                                                                       
46
 Troskie v Van der Walt 1994 3 SA 545 (O) 552. 
47
 Le Roux 2003 SA Mercantile Law Journal 116. 
48
 Christie Law of Contract 528. 
49
 Kerr Principles of the Law of Contract 530. Kerr's statement is probably derived from the English 
decision in Lumley v Wagner 42 ER 687. 
50
      Santos Professional Football Club (Pty) Ltd v Igesund 2002 5 SA 697 (C). 
51
 Santos Professional Football Club (Pty) Ltd v Igesund 2002 5 SA 697 (C) 698. 
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to the applicant, effectively committing breach of contract in the form of repudiation. 
The applicant approached the court for an order of specific performance against the 
first respondent, which would, if granted, compel the latter to serve as head coach of 
the former until 30 June 2003. The contract contained the following clause: 
 
9.1. Should the head coach commit any breach of this agreement and fail 
to remedy such breach within 14 days after registered post of notice 
from the club or its attorneys requiring the head coach to do so, the 
club shall have the right to cancel forthwith, or to take action against 
the head coach for specific performance of his obligation under the 
agreement.52 
 
This clause clearly provided for the remedy of specific performance in the event of 
breach of contract by any of the parties. 
 
The reasons provided by the first respondent for wanting to leave the service of the 
applicant were as reasonable and convincing as any. These reasons included a lack 
of security of employment, wishing to relocate his family to Cape Town, "and a much 
better offer received from another club"53 (author's emphasis). Desai J in fact stated 
expressly that "the respondent's principal reason for leaving the applicant is a 
commercial one, namely that he has secured a better contract".54 Arendse SC on 
behalf of the applicant contended that "it would be a blatantly unfair labour practice, 
constituting an infringement of the applicant's constitutional rights, to allow the first 
respondent to resile from his contract purely on the basis that he has received a 
better offer".55  
 
Desai J went so far as to state that the first respondent could not avoid the 
consequences of performing under the contract by merely alleging an unwillingness 
to continue to perform under the contract.56 The court further stated that "a party may 
resile from a contract only on one of the recognised grounds relating to breach or 
                                            
52
 Santos Professional Football Club (Pty) Ltd v Igesund 2002 5 SA 697 (C) 699. 
53
 Santos Professional Football Club (Pty) Ltd v Igesund 2002 5 SA 697 (C) 699. The club referred 
to is the Ajax Cape Town Club. 
54
 Santos Professional Football Club (Pty) Ltd v Igesund 2002 5 SA 697 (C) 699. The first 
respondent received a signing-on fee of R250 000.00 at the applicant, with a monthly salary of 
R30 000.00. The offer he had received from the second respondent consisted of a signing-on fee 
of R800 000.00 with a monthly salary of R62 000.00. 
55
 Santos Professional Football Club (Pty) Ltd v Igesund 2002 5 SA 697 (C) 699. 
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repudiation or upon notice where this is provided for in the contract".57 However, in 
deciding whether the remedy of specific performance was a relevant one in this 
particular case, the court stated the following:58 
 
The nature of the services are of such a personal nature that it would be 
virtually impossible to determine whether the first respondent is functioning 
optimally. He no longer wishes to work for the applicant. Should I compel him 
to be their coach for a further 12 months? Would this not compromise his 
dignity? He has problems with regard to his family which may or may not be 
resolved if he moves on to another team. Furthermore, first respondent's 
relationship with applicant has deteriorated. There has been a great deal of 
publicity, perhaps fuelled to some extent by the applicant or its lawyers, which 
has undoubtedly exacerbated the ill-feeling between the parties. I do not 
believe that in these circumstances they will be able to restore a working 
relationship, let alone the intimate relationship of that of a coach and his 
team. 
 
The court succumbed to the perception of reluctance to order specific performance 
in cases of breach of contract where the defaulting party is required to render 
performance of a very personal nature (such as contracts of employment) mentioned 
by Le Roux59 and Christie60 above. What the court failed to take into account is that 
the nature of the contract of employment in the current matter (as well as the nature 
of a player's contract in general) differed somewhat from the nature of a prima facie 
contract of employment. To substantiate this statement, one must investigate the full 
bench decision in this, and also Naudé's remarks following the decision. 
 
4.2 Santos Professional Football Club (Pty) Ltd v Igesund61 
 
The importance of the full bench's decision lies therein that Foxcroft J conducted a 
search into the true nature of the remedy of specific performance in South African 
law. The nature of the remedy was compared to a similar remedy in English law, and 
the origin of the remedy in South African law was investigated. This is an indication 
that the court's eventual decision should probably be regarded as the most 
                                                                                                                                       
56
 Santos Professional Football Club (Pty) Ltd v Igesund 2002 5 SA 697 (C) 699. 
57
 Santos Professional Football Club (Pty) Ltd v Igesund 2002 5 SA 697 (C) 699. 
58
 Santos Professional Football Club (Pty) Ltd v Igesund 2002 5 SA 697 (C) 701. 
59
 Le Roux 2003 SA Mercantile Law Journal 116. 
60
 Christie Law of Contract 528. 
61
 Santos Professional Football Club (Pty) Ltd v Igesund 2003 5 SA 73 (C).   
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thoroughly-researched one (at the time) in the context of the remedy of specific 
performance with regard to players' contracts, but also to the nature of the player's 
contract. 
 
The first applicable point the court makes is that one should be reminded that both 
parties in the current case had agreed to the fact that breach by either of them would 
render the right "to take action for specific performance" to the other party.62 On this 
point, the court made it abundantly clear that the right to decide upon a suitable 
remedy rests with the injured party, and it is not for the party in breach to prescribe to 
the injured party which remedy to pursue, as the first respondent had attempted to 
do in casu.63 Foxcroft J stated: "As I have tried to show, defendant (first respondent) 
has no right to prescribe how the plaintiff will make the election provided by law."64 
 
The abovementioned statement was the first indication that the court felt that there 
had to be a way, especially in a professional era of sport, not to let the obligation of 
honouring a contract of employment become a watered-down phenomenon. The 
court further stated that on the facts of the case there did not seem to be any 
inequity in obliging the first respondent to adhere to his contract.65 In fact, according 
to the court, the appellant (Santos) was the only party that would be prejudiced if the 
first respondent were to be compelled to perform, and subsequently were to perform 
inadequately.66 The question raised by Desai J as to whether or not an order 
compelling the first respondent to continue working for an employer for which he did 
not want to work would compromise his (the first respondent's) dignity was answered 
by Foxcroft J in the negative:67 
 
It must be remembered that we are dealing with a contract which first 
respondent entered into freely and voluntarily and in terms of which he 
agreed to an order of specific performance being made. 
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It was decided that a binding agreement existed between the appellant (the applicant 
in the court a quo) and the first respondent. The court ordered the first respondent to 
continue as head coach of the appellant until 30 June 2003 on the terms and 
conditions set out in the memorandum of agreement between the parties. 
 
In expounding the legal position in the wake of the case, Cornelius stated in 2003 
that "while an athlete is still under contract, he or she can and should be restrained 
from moving to another club without permission from the current club".68 Naudé 
added that "setting a precedent that even such an 'abnormal' employment contract 
can never be specifically enforced may give rise to grave injustice and the evasion of 
plain contractual duties".69 
 
The full bench-decision in Santos established the fact that while the courts may have 
been reluctant before 2003 to order specific performance in cases of breach of 
contract where services of a very personal nature must be rendered by the defaulting 
party, the nature of the contract of employment between a professional sportsman or 
sportswoman (an employee) and his or her employer is sui generis, and should 
therefore be approached differently from the prima facie contract of employment. 
Because of this sui generis personal nature of the relationship and the contract, it is 
submitted that in similar cases specific performance would in fact be the most 
suitable remedy. This opinion is supported by Naudé,70 who identifies four reasons 
why the court in the Santos-case granted specific performance of the contract in 
question. Firstly, it was emphasised that the contract was not "an ordinary contract of 
employment".71 Van der Merwe et al echo this decision by stating the following: 
 
The factor that tipped the scales was that the contract in issue was not an 
ordinary contract of employment. The parties contracted on an equal footing 
and the employee enjoyed much latitude in performing his duties. There also 
was no breakdown in the interpersonal relationship and no recognised 
hardship to the defendant.72 
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Three features of the said contract were relied upon to confirm the its uniqueness, 
namely: 
 
1. The court emphasised the fact that clause 9 of the contract granted the right to 
sue for specific performance in case of breach.73 This relates closely to the 
following statement by Cameron JA in Brisley v Drotsky:74 
 
On the contrary, the Constitution's values of dignity and equality and freedom 
require that the Courts approach their task of striking down contracts or 
declining to enforce them with perceptive restraint. One of the reasons, as 
Davis J has pointed out, is that contractual autonomy informs also the 
constitutional value of dignity. 
 
Consequently, a person must be held bound to what he or she may have 
contracted on because of the constitutional values mentioned by Cameron JA. 
 
2. The first respondent was given carte blanche in the execution of his professional 
duty of coaching and team selection.75 The contract itself prohibited the club from 
interfering in the coaching, selection and substitutions of the team.76 This 
effectively cancelled out the essential element of authority by the employer over 
the employee as discussed above, and should in itself be sufficient motivation for 
the fact that the contract in question (as well as the player's contract in general) 
was a sui generis employment contract, in terms of which specific performance in 
case of breach was the most appropriate remedy. 
 
3. The first respondent (and subsequently the defaulting party) had contracted on 
equal terms with the employer. This fact appears from the large sum of money 
the former commanded.77 This is a clear indication that the first respondent was 
not a "servant" in the typical "master and servant" relationship mentioned above. 
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The second reason why the court granted specific performance in the Santos-
decision, was because specific performance was (and is) considered the primary 
remedy for breach of contract in South African law. This was firmly established in 
Benson v SA Mutual Life Assurance Society,78 wherein Hefer JA exclaimed that the 
right to specific performance in South African law was decided as long ago as 
1882.79 In deciding this, the court in the Santos-case effectively rejected the 
proposition that specific performance should not be granted where an award of 
damages would adequately compensate the aggrieved party.80 This decision had a 
significant influence on later decisions of the same kind, most notably in the Mapoe-
decision discussed below. What the court in Santos did not take into account 
according to Naudé, was the suggestion in the Benson-case that the adequacy of 
damages, as well as other obstacles to the granting of specific performance derived 
from English law, "remained valid factors which are to be considered on the same 
basis as any other relevant fact".81 It should be kept in mind that granting the remedy 
of specific performance against a defaulting contractant should not have an unjust or 
inequitable result. 
 
The third reason why the court in the Santos-case saw it fit to grant an order of 
specific performance was the fact that the first respondent's reason for wanting to 
end the employment relationship with his employer was a commercial one, and was 
not based on a breakdown in the relationship.82 In case of a breakdown in the 
employment relationship, such a breakdown may certainly be a consideration 
against specific performance, especially if the employer is partly to blame for the 
breakdown.83 Forcing an employee to remain bound to a contract in terms of which 
the employment relationship has been damaged may well intrude on the employee's 
dignity, as Desai J stated in the Santos-decision, writing on behalf of the court a quo. 
It would not be a valid excuse for an employee to claim that the relationship between 
himself or herself and his or her employer has deteriorated because of his (the 
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employee's) breach. If the employer should elect to apply for an order of specific 
performance, it means that such an employer is willing to carry the risk that the 
employee might not perform optimally if forced to honour his or her contract. 
 
The fourth and final reason identified by Naudé as to why the Full Bench in the 
Santos-case ordered specific performance of the contract in question was the fact 
that "practical considerations were irrelevant to the court's equitable discretion to 
refuse specific performance, which should be based only on "recognised hardship to 
the defaulting party".84 
 
When considering these reasons for granting the remedy of specific performance of 
a contract of employment, it is clear that the employment contract in question 
possessed some characteristics that are sui generis in nature, and that this actually 
enabled the court to grant specific performance despite the fact that it could very 
easily have ordered a surrogate of damages to be paid by the defaulting party. If, 
however, damages had been ordered, the order would have made a mockery of the 
employment contract in South Africa. It is submitted that the decision of the full 
bench in the Santos-case was correct, which is why the decision was followed by the 
High Court in the Mapoe-case.85 
 
4.3 Confirmation of the correctness of the full bench-decision in Santos: 
Vrystaat Cheetahs (Edms) Beperk v Mapoe 
 
The first respondent in the Mapoe-case had signed a valid contract of employment 
on the 30th of May 2008 in terms of which he was bound to play professional rugby 
for the applicant until the 31st of October 2011.86 During the course of 2010, 
however, the first respondent repudiated his contract with the applicant by signing 
another contract of employment with the second respondent (Sharks (Edms) 
Beperk). The matter was referred for arbitration on the grounds that, firstly, the 
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contract between the applicant and the first respondent was invalid, and secondly, 
that the employment relationship between the parties had broken down 
irretrievably.87 Furthermore, the first respondent claimed that the applicant had 
discriminated against him by making him sign the contract in question while he was 
only twenty years old, not represented by an agent, ignorant and inexperienced.88 It 
was ordered by the arbitrator that the first respondent had to honour his contract with 
the applicant until it lapsed on 31 October 2010. The first respondent ignored the 
arbitrator's order and continued practising with the second respondent. The applicant 
then applied for an interdict to compel the first respondent to comply with his (the first 
respondent's) contractual obligations, which, if granted, would effectively result in an 
order of specific performance against the first respondent. 
 
In hearing the application for the interdict, Van Zyl J made mention of clause 13 of 
the South African Rugby Union Regulations Player Status, Player Contracts and 
Player Movement, which states that if a player, agent or province should be guilty of 
transgressing any of the regulations, certain remedies would be available to the 
innocent party, among which damages to be paid to the latter occurs.89 Van Zyl J 
decided that none of the remedies that appear in the list would be suitable in the 
current matter, as they would not have the same result as to the protection of the 
applicant's interests. The court dealt with the Benson decision discussed above, as 
well as the decision in Haynes v Kingwilliamstown Municipality,90 especially 
regarding the matters of "undue hardship" to the player if he were to be compelled to 
comply with his contractual obligations, and the "discretion of the court" to grant 
specific performance in case of breach of contractual obligations.91 The first and 
second respondents relied heavily on the Troskie-decision discussed above in 
attempting to prove that a court could not grant an order of specific performance for 
the rendering of personal services. This argument was rejected by Van Zyl J, who 
correctly stated that the Troskie-case was decided in an era wherein rugby players 
                                            
87
 Vrystaat Cheetahs (Edms) Beperk v Mapoe 4587/2010 (29 Sep 2010) 7. 
88
 Vrystaat Cheetahs (Edms) Beperk v Mapoe 4587/2010 (29 Sep 2010) 55. This was a relatively 
poor claim considering Cameron JA's decision in Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA). 
89
 Vrystaat Cheetahs (Edms) Beperk v Mapoe 4587/2010 (29 Sep 2010) 90-91. 
90
      Haynes v Kingwilliamstown Municipality 1951 (2) SA 371 (A). 
91
 Vrystaat Cheetahs (Edms) Beperk v Mapoe 4587/2010 (29 Sep 2010) 90. 
K MOULD          PER / PELJ 2011(14)1 
 
207 / 234 
 
still had to conform to the amateur code.92 The court went further by stating that the 
facts of and context in which the Santos-case was decided related more closely to 
the current case. Not surprisingly, the court depended primarily on the full bench 
decision in Santos, which has already been dealt with in detail above. Consequently, 
it was decided that the court's discretion would be exercised in favour of the 
applicant. The first respondent was compelled to honour his contractual obligations 
to the applicant. 
 
It is submitted that the court's reasoning and ultimate decision was correct in view of 
current South African authority. In order to predict what the outcome of a possible 
appeal in the current case would be, one has to investigate the suitability of the 
remedy of specific performance in case of breach of a player's contract. 
 
5 The suitability of the remedy of specific performance in case of breach 
of a player's contract 
 
It has been stated above and well argued elsewhere that the remedy of specific 
performance is a primary one in South Africa, as opposed to England,93 where it is at 
most a secondary or equitable remedy. Consequently, a party is in principle entitled 
to insist upon proper and full performance by the other party.94 
 
In early Roman Law, a contractant who committed breach of contract could not be 
ordered to deliver a thing or render a service, but only to pay a sum of money.95 In 
later Roman times and certainly in Roman-Dutch law, it became possible for a 
contractant to obtain an order for specific performance.96 Under the influence of 
English law, in terms of which specific performance has always been viewed as an 
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exceptional remedy,97 South African courts had begun to exercise their discretion in 
such a manner "that it appeared as if an order for specific performance would be 
automatically refused whenever particular circumstances were present".98 This 
approach was in direct contrast to the South African legal one, which has always 
stated that an order for specific performance should be refused in exceptional 
circumstances only.99 
 
The situation where an employer seeks an order for specific performance against an 
employee is a little more complicated, because the personal freedom of the 
employee is at issue.100 The obvious risk that arises is that it may be considered 
forced labour. Van der Merwe et al state that "a distinction is drawn between an 
undertaking by an employee not to enter into the service of another employer during 
the term of his contract of service and a positive undertaking to enter into the service 
of an employer. The former type of undertaking would be enforced more readily than 
the latter".101 However, in both the Troskie and Santos cases the employee had 
given an undertaking not to enter into the service of another employer, and yet did 
just that. In the Troskie case an application to compel the employee to honour his 
contract was refused, as was done in the Santos-case by the court a quo. The full 
bench in the latter case as well as Van Zyl J in the Mapoe-case rectified the matter. 
The question that needs to be answered with regard to future South African 
decisions in similar matters is if the remedy of specific performance is a suitable one 
in case of breach of a professional player's contract. 
 
Whitehill102 expresses the opinion that if professional sportsmen and sportswomen 
were allowed to freely disregard their contractual obligations, the sports industry's 
existence would be threatened.103 Because a professional player's worth cannot be 
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calculated in monetary terms ("dollar damages" as Whitehill refers to it), the historic 
remedy in most states of the United States of America for a player's breach of 
contract is negative injuction.104 This makes the decision in the case of Philadelphia 
Ball Club Ltd v Lajoie105 applicable to the South African context. In this case the 
defendant, a professional baseball player, was lured away from the plaintiff, with 
which he had had a valid contract, by an opposing American League club. The 
incentive used by the latter to lure the defendant away from his existing contract was 
exactly the same as that in the Santos and Mapoe cases, namely an increased 
salary.106 While the trial court in Philadelphia Ball Club Ltd refused to grant 
injunction, based on the fact, firstly, that the defendant did not posses such unique 
abilities as to make him impossible to replace and secondly, that the contract lacked 
the requisite mutuality, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected these reasons and 
ordered the defendant to remain in the plaintiff's service for the remainder of their 
contract.107 In casu, it was established that if a player possessed "unique skills" and 
contributed to the sport he or she played or the employer he or she represented in a 
unique manner, then equity would demand that such a player be forced to honour his 
or her contract with his or her employer.108 Whitehill concedes that situations may 
arise in which the services of a player would be easily replaced, and the employer 
would not suffer irreparable harm. In these cases, damages would be an adequate 
and suitable remedy to the employer. However, once the "uniqueness test" 
mentioned above has been passed by the player in question, "the determination of 
irreparable harm is automatic", and specific performance is the only suitable 
remedy.109 In the Mapoe-case it was established that the first respondent was indeed 
a unique player, not only because of his obvious exceptional talent, but also because 
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he was a black player. Van Zyl J made mention of the "gentleman's agreement" that 
existed, and still exists, between teams that compete in the Currie Cup and the 
South African Rugby Union, which entails that every team that takes the field should 
contain a quota of at least three black players. At the time of the decision the 
applicant in the Mapoe-decision had struggled to find black players of Currie Cup 
standard.110 This fact made the first respondent even more "unique" to the applicant, 
and made his compliance with his contract even more important. The possibility was 
even raised by the court that if the applicant did not comply with the "gentleman's 
agreement" mentioned above, it (the applicant) would be subject to sanctions or 
fines imposed by the South African Rugby Union.111 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
Having investigated the relevant nature of the employment relationship in South 
Africa, it has been established that the relationship between a professional 
sportsman or sportswoman and the club or union that employs him or her is one of 
employment. However, it has also been established that this relationship, and 
consequently the contract that governs it, possess certain sui generis characteristics. 
Because of these sui generis characteristics, the remedy of specific performance, 
which is not regularly granted in cases of breach of contract of personal services 
(such as the playing of rugby union), has been established as the most suitable 
remedy. If the player's contract in question has been found to be valid, fair and legal, 
there is no reason why a court should grant an employer a surrogate of damages 
where the latter has applied for an order of specific performance. It is submitted that 
the decisions in the Santos and Mapoe cases, therefore, were correct, based on 
existing South African and applicable foreign law. 
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